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THE APPLICATION OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE TO
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Coney v. JL. G. Industries, Inc.,
97 Ill. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983)
DANIEL J. VOELKER, 1985*
In 1981, the Illinois Supreme Court inAlvis v. RibarI abolished the
common law doctrine of contributory negligence and adopted in its
place a "pure" form2 of comparative negligence. 3 The issue of compar-
ative negligence was not one of first impression in Illinois; thirteen
years earlier in Maki v. Frelk4 the court had held that such a "far-
reaching change" involved "numerous problems" and would be better
left to the General Assembly. 5 Despite the many problems and un-
resolved issues that would result from a piecemeal judicial adoption of
comparative negligence rather than from a comprehensive legislative
* B.S. University of Illinois, 1982; Candidate for J.D., lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,
1985.
1. 85 Il. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
2. Id. at 28, 421 N.E.2d at 898. There are presently four types of comparative negligence in
existence. The first type is "Slight-Gross" which allows the apportionment of damages only when
the plaintiffs negligence is deemed "slight" in comparison with the "gross" negligence of the
defendant.
The second and third types of comparative negligence are both "Modified" approaches. The
second allows the apportionment of damages only when the plaintiffs negligence is "not as great
as" (or "not equal to") that of the defendant, and the third type allows the apportionment of
damages only when the plaintiffs negligence is "not greater than" that of the defendant. It is only
in situations where the plaintiff and defendant are adjudged by the trier of fact as equally negli-
gent that the difference between these two types of modified comparative negligence is evident.
The fourth type of comparative negligence is called the "Pure" form. Under the pure form
damages are apportioned in all situations where the plaintiff is deemed negligent. Thus, a plaintiff
could theoretically recover even when he is 99% at fault, but such a recovery would be limited to
1% of the total damages. See J. DOOLEY, MOD. TORT LAW §§ 5.02-.05 (1982).
3. Id. at 23, 421 N.E.2d at 896-97. For an excellent discussion of the ,4Ivis decision, see
Comment, Pure Comparative Negligence in Illinois, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 599 (1982).
4. 40 Ill. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968).
5. Id. at 196-97, 239 N.E.2d at 447-48. The Illinois Supreme Court has come in a complete
circle since its decision in Maki v. Frelk where the court reversed a lower appellate court decision
that abolished the common law doctrine of contributory negligence and adopted in its place the
defense of comparative negligence. Compare the language of Maki, "[Tihe legislative branch is
manifestly in a better position than is this court to consider the numerous problems involved." Id.
at 197, 239 N.E.2d at 448, with the language of Alvis, "We believe that the proper relationship
between the legislature and the court is one of cooperation and assistance in examining and
changing the common law to conform with the ever-changing demands of the community." 85 I11.
2d at 23, 421 N.E.2d at 896. See also Comment, Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparalive v.
Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide? 21 VAND. L. REV. 889 (1968).
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enactment, 6 the court in Alvis boldly departed from precedent followed
in Illinois for nearly a century7 and abolished the harsh and inequitable
rule of contributory negligence. Thus, Illinois became the 38th state to
adopt comparative negligence, but only the 7th state to do so judi-
cially. 8 The Alvis court, however, specifically restricted the application
of its holding to negligence actions and left "the resolution of other
collateral issues to future cases." 9
6. Mr. Justice Underwood dissented in Alvis because he believed, as he had in Maki, that
such a change affecting so much of the law would be better left to the state legislature. Justice
Underwood recognized the many unresolved issues left by the Alvis majority when he stated:
What modifications, for example, are now to be made in the doctrines of strict products
liability (citation omitted), assumption of the risk, wilful and wanton misconduct, the
liability of property owners to licensees, invitees, and trespassers, and many others?
While the newly decreed rule of comparative negligence may ultimately affect all of
these situations to a now unknown degree, the court can consider only one case at a time.
Unless the legislature acts, it will in all probability be years before these questions can be
judicially answered.
85 Ill. 2d at 29, 421 N.E.2d at 899.
7. In Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 Ill. 358, 3 N.E. 456 (1885), the Illinois
Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of contributory negligence and followed it relentlessly for 96
years until overruling it in Alvis.
8. The 37 states which had adopted comparative negligence prior to Illinois were: Alaska-
Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975) (pure); Arkansas-ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 27-
1765 (1979) (modified); California-Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1975) (pure); Colorado-CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973) (modified); Connecti-
cut-CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 52-572-0 (West 1980) (modified); Florida-Hoffman v. Jones, 280
So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (pure); Georgia-GA. CODE ANN. § 51-11-7 (1981) (modified); Hawaii-
HA.WAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976) (modified); Idaho-IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801, 6-802 (1979)
(modified); Kansas-KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1976) (modified); Louisiana-LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 2323 (West Supp. 1981) (pure); Maine-ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980)
(modified); Massachusetts-MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 1978) (modified); Michi-
gan-Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979) (pure); Minne-
sota-MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West 1981) (modified); Mississippi-Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-
7-15, 11-7-17 (1972) (pure); Montana-MONT. CODE ANN. § 58-607 (1977) (modified); Ne-
braska-NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979) (slight/gross); Nevada-NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.141
(1979) (modified); New Hampshire-N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.7a (Supp. 1979) (modified);
New Jersey-N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 15-5.1 to 2A: 15-5.3 (West 1980) (modified); New Mexico--
Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981) (pure); New York-N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW
§ 1411-13 (McKinney 1976) (pure); North Dakota-N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975) (modi-
fied); Ohio-OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page 1980) (modified); Oklahoma-OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13, 14 (West 1980) (modified); Oregon-OR. REV. STAT. §§ 18.470-18.490 (1979)
(modified); Pennsylvania-PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7102(a) (Purdon 1980) (modified); Rhode
Island-R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-20-4, 9-204.1 (1980) (pure); South Dakota-S.D. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979) (slight/gross); Texas-TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon 1979)
(modified); Utah-UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977) (modified); Vermont-VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1036 (1973) (modified); Washington-WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.22.005-.020 (1980)
(pure); West Virginia-Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979) (modi-
fied); Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1980) (modified); and Wyoming-Wyo.
STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977) (modified).
9. 85 Ill. 2d 1, 28, 421 N.E.2d 886, 896-97. The court in Alvis stated, "We therefore hold
that in cases involving negligence the common law doctrine of contributory negligence is no longer
the law in the State of Illinois, and in those instances where applicable it is replaced by the doctrine of
comparative negligence." (emphasis added). Id. at 25, 421 N.E.2d at 896-97.
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Two years later, in Coney v. J.L.G Industries, Inc. ,1o the Illinois
Supreme Court addressed two of those yet unresolved issues. In a
unanimous decision written by Justice Moran, also the author of the
Alvis decision, the court held that comparative negligence or fault was
applicable to an action in strict products liability, and that the adoption
of comparative negligence did not require the elimination of the com-
mon law doctrine of joint and several liability. " In addition, the Coney
court addressed a third issue and held that the retention of joint and
several liability coupled with the defendant's inability to gain contribu-
tion did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to equal
protection. 12
In order to fully understand and evaluate the court's decision in
Coney a brief history and discussion of comparative negligence, strict
products liability, and joint and several liability will be set forth. Cases
in other jurisdictions which have addressed the issues present in Coney
will be examined. The comment will then set forth the facts of Coney
and the court's reasoning will be presented and analyzed. It will be
shown that the court's decision to apportion damages on a comparative
basis in a strict products liability action will result in a more equitable
allocation of damages than was obtained under Illinois' previous ap-
proach of no comparison. In addition, it will be shown that the court
selected a method of comparison which will provide a workable and
analytically sound solution to the trier of fact's difficult task of appor-
tioning damages between a strictly liable defendant and a negligent
plaintiff. Finally, this comment will consider whether the court's re-
fusal to abolish the common law doctrine of joint and several liability
was consistent with its decision to adopt comparative negligence. This
comment will conclude that the retention of joint and several liability is
absolutely essential in order to protect a plaintifi's right to a fair and
adequate compensation for his injuries.
10. 97 II1. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983).
11. Id. at 119, 124, 454 N.E.2d at 204, 206.
12. Id. at 126, 454 N.E.2d at 207. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal
protection of the laws.
See also ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2 which states that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws."
1045
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability
At common law, a plaintiff who had negligently contributed to his
own injury in any way was barred from recovering damages.' 3 The
inequity' 4 of the English doctrine' 5 of contributory negligence was ap-
parent. Early courts eventually recognized exceptions to the maxim
and attempted to ameliorate its harsh consequences.' 6 These excep-
tions, however, were inapplicable in many factual situations, thus leav-
ing many plaintiffs uncompensated. Some commentators have
suggested, however, that juries provided relief by disregarding the
judge's instructions on contributory negligence and reducing damages
sua sponte.' 7 Persuaded by principles of fairness and logic, the courts
and legislatures in a majority of jurisdictions 18 have recently launched
a virtual "stampede"' 9 to abolish this harsh "all or nothing" rule in
favor of comparative negligence. Instead of acting as an absolute bar
to recovery, comparative negligence will allow the trier of fact to allo-
13. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 65 at 416 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
14. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189, 201-02 (1950),
presents this criticism of the inequity of the contributory negligence rule:
Why then, if an accident results from the negligence of two or more persons, should the
noxal consequences be distributed so unevenly? Why should the mutilated victim have
to suffer the sorrows of pain, tears, and sleepless nights while his opponent, perhaps
guilty of fault to a higher degree, is free to leave a court of justice bearing a certificate
that he is not to be deemed a tort feasor. To call such a result "harsh" is to use a mild
expression, to say the least!
15. The first case to recognize the doctrine of contributory negligence as an absolute defense
to an action in negligence was Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809). The language of
the court often quoted reads as follows: "A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which
has been made by the fault of another, and avail himself of it, if he do not himself use ordinary
caution to be in the right." 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
16. Recognized exceptions included: 1) Last clear chance, which originated in Davies v.
Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842), where the court stated, "as the defendant might, by proper care,
have avoided injuring the animal, and did not, he is liable for the consequences of his negligence,
though the animal may have been improperly there." 152 Eng. Rep. at 589. Thus, it became the
law that a defendant could not complain of the plaintiff's contributory negligence when he himself
had the last clear chance to avoid the injury; 2) Plaintiff's contributory negligence was no defense
when the defendant's conduct was deemed "willful," "wanton," or "reckless"; 3) Plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence was no defense when the defendant violated a statute which was intended to
protect a plaintiff against his own improvident acts. See generally Green, Illinois Negligence Law,
39 ILL. L. REV. 36 (1944).
17. See, e.g., Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo. L.
REV. 431, 431 (1978).
18. See supra, note 8 and accompanying text.
19. Since 1971, 29 states have adopted comparative negligence. In the words of Professor
Schwartz, "The march of comparative negligence is now a stampede." V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARA-
TIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.1 at 2 (Cum. Sup. 1981). See also Fleming, The Supreme Court of California
1974-1975-Foreword" Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV.
239, 239 (1976), where the author states, "Comparative negligence, once the Cinderella of Ameri-
can law, is at long last blossoming into a princess."
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cate damages in direct proportion to each parties' degree of
carelessness.
A similar "stampede" has occurred in the area of products liabil-
ity. Since the California Supreme Court's seminal decision in Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,20 and its progeny, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 402A, 21 the theory of recovery known as strict
liability in tort has gained nearly unanimous approval in each of the
fifty states.22 The novelty underlying this theory of recovery derives
20. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). In Greenman, the court specifically
held that "a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, know-
ing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to
a human being." Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]
provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
22. The following states and districts have judicially adopted the strict liability in tort theory
of recovery: Alabama-Atkins v. American Motor Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976); Alaska-
Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Arizona--O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz.
556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); California-Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Colorado--Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544
P.2d 983 (1976); Connecticut-Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 290, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Dela-
ware-Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976); District of Columbia-
Young v. Up-Right Scaffolds, Inc., 637 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Florida-West v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Hawaii-Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52
Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970); Idaho-Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857
(1974); Illinois-Suvada v. White Motor Corp., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Indiana-
Ayr-Way Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood, 261 Ind. 86, 300 N.E.2d 335 (1973); Iowa-Hawkeye-Security
Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Kansas-Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698,
545 P.2d 1104 (1976); Kentucky-Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441
(Ky. 1966); Louisiana-Weber v. Fidelity Casualty Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971);
Maryland-Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Minnesota-
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); Mississippi-State Stove
Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. deniedsub nom. Yates v. Hodges, 386 U.S.
912 (1967); Missouri-Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Montana-
Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Ne-
braska-Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971); Nevada-Ginnis v.
Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970); New Hampshire-Buttrick v. Arthur Les-
sard & Sons, 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); New Jersey-Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,
44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); New Mexico--Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732
(1972); New York--Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 298 N.E.2d 622 (1973);
North Dakota-Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974); Ohio--Lonzrick
v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966); Oklahoma-Kirkland v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Oregon-Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467,
435 P.2d 806 (1967); Pennsylvania-Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); Rhode Is-
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from the fact that, unlike the older theories of warranty and negligence,
it requires neither contractual privity 23 nor proof of defendant's
negligence.
24
Illinois had previously abolished the requirement of privity in
cases involving deleterious food25 and other "inherently dangerous"
products, 26 but the difficult task of proving the manufacturer's negli-
gence remained until the Illinois Supreme Court's landmark decision
in Suvada v. White Motor Co. 27  In Suvada, the court abolished the
necessity of proving the manufacturer's negligence and explicitly
adopted strict liability in tort28 as set forth in the Restatement .29 The
court in Suvada thereby acknowledged the Restatement's view that
"public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by
products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market
them, and be treated as a cost of production. ' 30 As a result, it became
well-settled in Illinois that a plaintiff who was guilty of contributory
land-Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971); South Dakota-Eng-
berg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104 (1973); Tennessee-Ford Motor Co. v.
Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966); Texas-McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Utah-Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah
1979); Vermont-Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 333 A.2d 110 (1975); Washington-Ulmer v.
Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969); West Virginia-Morningstar v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (1979); Wisconsin-Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155
N.W.2d 55 (1967).
The following states have adopted strict liability in tort by statute: Arkansas-ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 85-2-318.2, 85-2-318.3 (1973); Georgia-GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11 (1981); Maine-ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 221 (1973); and South Carolina-S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law.
Co-op 1974).
23. Privity of contract is defined as "[t]hat connection or relationship which exists between
two or more contracting parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1079 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
24. See generally PROSSER, supra note 13 at § 98.
25. Wiedman v. Keller, 171 I11. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1897). Here, the defendant a retail dealer in
meats was held liable in damages to the purchaser and her family under an implied warranty
theory for the state of unwholesome and diseased meats. In holding for the purchaser and her
family the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
Where, however, articles of food are purchased from a retail dealer for immediate con-
sumption, the consequences resulting from the purchase of an unsound article may be so
serious and may prove so disastrous to the health and life of the consumer that public
safety demands that there should be an implied warranty on the part of the vendor that
the article sold is sound and fit for the use for which it was purchased.
Id. at 99, 49 N.E. at 211.
26. Rotche v. Buick Motor Co., 358 111. 507, 193 N.E. 529 (1934). In Rotche, the Illinois
Supreme Court adopted the standard espoused by Justice Cardozo in the landmark case of Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), which stated that privity would
be irrelevant to recovery, "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, . . . knowledge that the thing will be used by persons
other than the purchaser, and used without new tests." Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
27. 32 IlI. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
28. Id. at 621, 210 N.E.2d at 187.
29. See RESTATEMENT supra note 21.
30. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, comment c at 350 (emphasis added).
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negligence in merely failing to inspect a product and discover a defect
that would have been discovered upon a reasonable inspection, would
not be barred from recovery in a strict products liability action. 31 On
the other hand, however, the Suvada court had made it clear that its
adoption of strict liability in tort did not make the manufacturer an
"absolute insurer" of its product. 32 Hence, Illinois courts consistently
held that in an action involving strict products liability, a plaintiff who
voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a known risk, assumed the
risk of injury33 and would be absolutely barred from recovery.
34 Simi-
larly, a plaintiff who misused 35 a product in a manner neither reason-
ably foreseeable nor intended by the manufacturer would also be
precluded from any recovery.
36
With the increasing acceptance of both comparative negligence
and strict liability doctrines has come marked disagreement among
courts37 and commentators 38 as to the applicability of comparative neg-
31. The Illinois Supreme Court has apparently adopted comment n of the RESTATEMENT
which provides: "Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence
consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility
of its existence." RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, comment n at 356. See Williams v. Brown Mfg.
Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62
I11. 2d 77, 338 N.E.2d 857 (1975).
32. 32 Ill. 2d 612, 623, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (1965). In Illinois, a plaintiff in a strict products
liability action must prove three elements in order to recover from a manufacturer or seller: I) that
the injury resulted from a condition of the product; 2) that the condition was an unreasonably
dangerous one; 3) and that the condition existed at the time it left the manufacturer's control. See
also Kissel, Defenses to Strict Liability, 60 ILL. B. J. 450 (1972), where the author states, "The
concept of strict liability does not connote liability without fault. A variety of defenses to a strict
liability claim may be available if counsel is energetic enough to discover and use such defenses."
33. In Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970), the Illinois
Supreme Court made it clear that the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk was essentially
a subjective test "in the sense that it is his [the plaintiff's] knowledge, understanding and apprecia-
tion of the danger which must be assessed, rather than that of the reasonably prudent person." Id.
at 430, 261 N.E.2d at 312. However, the court qualified the subjectivity of this test when it stated,
"No juror is compelled by the subjective nature of this test to accept a user's testimony that he was
unaware of the danger, if, in the light of all of the evidence, he could not have been unaware of the
hazard." Id. at 430-31, 261 N.E.2d at 312.
34. See, e.g., Ralston v. Illinois Power Co., 13 Ill. App. 3d 95, 299 N.E.2d 497 (1973) (plaintiff
found to have assumed the risk as a matter of law when he admitted that he was fully aware of the
danger involved in his job).
35. The affirmative defense commonly called "misuse" is based on an objective test; plain-
tiff's conduct will be measured against that of a reasonably prudent person. Williams v. Brown
Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d at 425, 261 N.E.2d at 309.
36. See, e.g., McCormick v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 81 Ill. App. 3d 154, 400 N.E.2d 1009 (1980)
(plaintiff misused crane when crane was loaded to near capacity in unfavorable wind conditions
and was operated on unsolid ground).
37. As of August 31, 1983, thirteen of the states' highest courts have held comparative princi-
ples applicable to strict products liability. These states include: Alaska-Butaud v. Suburban
Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); California-Daly v. General Motors
Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); Florida-West v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Hawaii-Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 65 Hawaii 447,
654 P.2d 343 (1982); Kansas-Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980);
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ligence to an action in strict products liability. The minority of courts
which have held the defense of comparative negligence inapplicable to
an action in strict products liability have generally relied upon one or
more of several distinct rationales.
39
One rationale is illustrated by the decision of the Colorado Court
of Appeals in Kinard v. Coats Co. 40 In Kinard, the plaintiff, a service
station operator, was injured while using a hydraulic bumper jack. The
manufacturer argued that Colorado's comparative negligence statute
should apply in this products liability action because it believed that
the plaintiff was negligent and should be held partially responsible for
the injury. The court rejected defendant's contention, reasoning that
the injection of negligence concepts into an area of liability which
rested on totally different policy considerations
4' was inappropriate.42
Illinois--Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., 97 I11. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983); Minnesota-Busch v.
Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); New Hampshire-Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); New Jersey-Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach.
Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Oregon-Baccelleri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351
(1979); Texas--General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); Utah-Mulherin
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); Wisconsin-Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443,
155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
Also, four federal courts have held comparative principles applicable to an action in strict
products liability. Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin Is-
lands law); Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Mississippi
law); Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 498 F. Supp. 389 (D. Mont. 1980) (applying Montana law);
Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976) (applying
Idaho law).
However, five courts have rejected the application of comparative negligence to strict prod-
ucts liability: Rhode Island-Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (ist Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 916 (1979) (applying Rhode Island law); Nebraska-Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d
795 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Nebraska law); Colorado-Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555,
553 P.2d 835 (1976); Oklahoma-Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974);
South Dakota-Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1979). See Razook, Merging Comparative
Fault and Strict Products Liability. The Casefor Judicial Innovation, 20 AM. Bus. L. J. 511 (1983).
38. In fact, at least one authority has called the application of comparative principles to strict
products liability "One of the most controversial issues in the products field today." FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, 2 PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 16A[5][gI[il (1983). A dichotomy of opinion exists between
the views of Dean Victor Schwartz, an advocate of the application, and Dean Aaron Twerski, a
staunch opponent of the application. Compare SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, § 12.7 at
207 (1974); with Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product
Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Twerski].
39. See infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
40. 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976).
41. In Greenman, the court stated that the purpose of strict liability in tort "is to insure that
the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves." This is commonly called the "loss-spreading" rationale. 59 Cal. 2d at 64, 377 P.2d at
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
42. 37 Colo. App. at 559, 553 P.2d at 837. A similar, but unsuccessful argument was made by
Justice Burke in his dissenting opinion in Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc.,
555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976). Specifically, Justice Burke argued that the application of comparative
negligence to an action in strict products liability would ignore and diminish the fundamental
policy considerations that had provided the impetus for this theory of recovery itself. Id. at 47.
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A second rationale frequently espoused by courts refusing to find
principles of comparative negligence compatible with strict products li-
ability is based on the conceptual and semantic difficulties in compar-
ing the "apples" of negligence with the "oranges" of strict liability. 43
This argument is premised on the theory that negligence is based on
fault or moral blameworthiness, whereas strict liability is not. Rather,
recovery under strict products liability focuses on the condition of the
product and not on the defendant's failure to exercise reasonable
care.44 It is argued that a jury is incapable of distinguishing between
these two dissimilar types of fault and apportioning damages accord-
ingly. Thus, in Smith v. Smith,a5 the Supreme Court of South Dakota
rejected plaintiffs request that it apply principles of comparative negli-
gence to an action in strict products liability because the court believed
that such a comparison would prove unworkable for a jury.46 This ar-
gument is more vividly illustrated by Justice Jefferson's vigorous dis-
sent in Daly v. General Motors Corp. 47 There, he argues that there is no
logical method for a jury to compare such "noncomparables," and any
such comparison would result in a mere "guessing game" where dam-
ages would be assessed by means of the "jurors' instincts, speculations,
conjectures and guesses," rather than through a rational formula or
43. See Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 559, 553 P.2d 835, 837-38 (1976), where the
court argued that the two types of fault are incomparable:
Products liability under § 402A does not rest upon negligence principles, but rather is
premised on the concept of enterprise liability for casting a defective product into the
stream of commerce (citations omitted). Thus, the focus is upon the nature of the prod-
uct, and the consumer's reasonable expectations with regard to that product, rather than
on the conduct either of the manufacturer or of the person injured because of the
product.
See also Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 319, 322, 609 P.2d 1382, 1383-84 (1980), where the
court similarly stated:
We have, however, pointed out the theoretical difficulties of comparing concepts of fault
(negligence) with no-fault (strict-liability) (citation omitted), and, while not closing the
door to a positive holding that the contributory negligence of a plaintiff could be a dam-
age-reducing factor in a case of strict products liability, we have given little comfort to
defendants that such a theoretical breakthrough will be forthcoming.
44. See supra note 43.
45. 278 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1979).
46. Id. at 161, n.7. In deciding that contributory negligence would also be no defense to an
action in strict products liability the court in Smith stated:
Strict liability is an abandonment of the fault concept in product liability cases. No
longer are damages to be borne by one who is culpable; rather they are borne by one
who markets the defective product. The question of whether the manufacturer or seller
is negligent is meaningless under such a concept; liability is imposed irrespective of his
negligence or freedom from it. Even though the manufacturer or seller is able to prove
beyond all doubt that the defect was not the result of his negligence, it would avail him
nothing. We believe it is inconsistent to hold that the user's negligence is material when
the seller's is not.
Id. at 160.
47. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978) (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
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standard.4 8
A third rationale relied upon by some of the courts rejecting the
application of comparative negligence to strict products liability rests
on the legislative drafting of the state's comparative negligence statute.
In Seay v. Chrysler Corp. ,49 the Supreme Court of Washington refused
to find its comparative negligence statute applicable to an action in
strict products liability. The court's reasoning was that its recently en-
acted statute by its language was only applicable to actions in negli-
gence, and was thus indicative of the legislature's desire to exclude
strict products liability from its application.50 Similarly, in Melia v.
FordMotor Co. ,51 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to hold
Nebraska's comparative negligence statute applicable to an action in
strict products liability because the statute, by its language, could only
be invoked when the plaintiff's negligence was "slight" in comparison
to the "gross" negligence of the defendant. The court believed that this
requirement would be "extremely confusing and inappropriate," since
under Nebraska law neither proof of defendant's negligence nor degree
of fault was required in an action in strict products liability.
52
The majority of jurisdictions, however, which have considered the
applicability of comparative negligence to an action in strict products
liability have found the two compatible. 53 Several of these jurisdictions
have comparative negligence statutes that, by their language, specifi-
cally apply to strict products liability. 54 Other jurisdictions have com-
parative negligence statutes that, by their language, are not limited to
negligence and have been interpreted by the courts to apply to strict
products liability.55 In addition, several courts have judicially adopted
comparative negligence and have further extended it to strict products
liability.56 It is generally agreed by these courts that although there
48. Id. at 752, 755, 575 P.2d at 1178, 1180, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 396, 398.
49. 93 Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980). See also Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521
P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okla. 1974) (comparative negligence statute not applicable to strict products
liability because it is limited by its language to negligence actions).
50. 93 Wash. at 322, 609 P.2d at 1384.
51. 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Nebraska law).
52. Id. at 802.
53. See supra note 37.
54. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.2, 85-2-318.3 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572-o
(West 1980); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN., § 600.2949 (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01
(West 1981) (amendment effective 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979) (amendment effective
1978).
55. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972) (as interpreted in Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.
512 F.2d at 290); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.015 (1981) (as interpreted in South v. A.B.
Chance Co., 96 Wash. 2d 439, 635 P.2d 728 (1981)).
56. The following states have both judicially adopted comparative negligence and judicially
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may be semantic and theoretical distinctions between negligence and
strict liability, the application of comparative negligence to strict prod-
ucts liability is nevertheless the most fundamentally fair and equitable
method of apportioning damages between the consumer and seller.
57
In spite of this general agreement, there are at least three distinct theo-
ries as to the appropriate method of comparing these two types of fault
and apportioning damages.
The earliest method of comparison was devised by the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin in Dippel v. Sciano ,58 the first decision to hold com-
parative negligence applicable to strict products liability. 59 The court
in Dippel carefully avoided the semantic difficulty associated with the
comparison of an injured plaintiffs negligence and a manufacturer's
strict liability by holding strict products liability "akin" to negligence
per se. 60 Traditionally, the doctrine of negligence per se relieves the
plaintiff of the burden of proving the defendant's negligence when the
defendant violates a standard of care fixed by the legislature and
adopted by the court.6' It is essential to the plaintiffs' prima facie case,
however, that he prove the elements of causation and damages. 62 In
this instance, the court explicitly adopted Section 402A of the Restate-
ment and treated it as if it were a legislatively decreed standard of care
or "safety statute." 63 The court justified this novel analogy by reason-
ing that both the violation of a safety statute which was designed to
protect a particular class against a particular harm and the marketing
extended it to strict products liability: Alaska, Florida, California, and Illinois. See supra notes 8,
37.
57. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d at 734, 742, 575 P.2d at 1167, 1172,
144 Cal. Rptr. at 385, 390 (1978), where the court stated:
While fully recognizing the theoretical and semantic distinctions between the twin prin-
ciples of strict products liability and traditional negligence, we think they can be blended
or accommodated ... We are convinced that in merging the two principles what may be
lost in symmetry is more than gained in fundamental fairness.
See also Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977);
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Baccelleri v.
Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351 (1979); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55
(1967).
58. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
59. Id. at 461-62, 155 N.W.2d at 64.
60. Id. at 461, 155 N.W.2d at 64. At least one commentator agrees with the logic of this
analogy:
In essence, strict liability in this sense is not different from negligence per se. Selling a
dangerously unsafe product is the equivalent of negligence regardless of the defendant's
conduct in letting it become unsafe . . .selling a dangerously unsafe chattel is negli-
gence within itself.
Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.W.L.J. 5, 14 (1965).
61. See PROSSER, supra note 13, § 36 at 200.
62. Id. at 201.
63. 37 Wis. 2d at 459-62, 155 N.W.2d at 63-65.
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of a defective product could create an unreasonable risk of harm to
others, and thus, should be treated alike. 64 In addition, the court had
no objection to instructing jurors to compare the plaintiff's failure to
exercise ordinary care with the manufacturer's negligence per se and to
apportion damages accordingly because comparison of these two types
of fault was already widely approved in Wisconsin.65 Two other juris-
dictions, Alabama 66 and Florida,67 have also held strict products liabil-
ity analogous to negligence per se, but of these, only Florida recognizes
comparative negligence as a viable defense to an action in strict prod-
ucts liability.
In another larger group of jurisdictions led by California, 68 the
courts have similarly extended comparative principles to strict products
liability. 69 These jurisdictions, however, have labeled their system one
of "comparative fault" out of the recognition that although strict liabil-
ity is not based on moral fault, it is based on legal or "quasi-fault. '70
Thus, it is argued by these jurisdictions that the conceptual or semantic
difficulty of comparing these two types of fault is more theoretical than
real, since jurors can in fact logically compare the plaintiff's culpability
with the manufacturer's "legal" fault in putting the defective product
into the stream of commerce and apportion damages accordingly. 71
Courts in Idaho,72 New Hampshire, 73 Texas, 74 Utah,75 Minne-
64. Id. at 462, 155 N.W.2d at 465.
65. Id., 155 N.W.2d at 464.
66. Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134, 140 (Ala. 1976).
67. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976).
68. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978).
69. See Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Mississippi
law); Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of General Motors, 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624 (1982); Kennedy v.
City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry and Mach. Co.,
81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
70. Carestia, The Interaction of Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability,- Where
Are We?, 47 INS. COUNSEL J. 53 (1980) (The "quasi-fault doctrine" was espoused by the author in
this article). See Wade, Products Liability and Plaintif's Fault-The Uniform Comparative Fault
Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373, 377 (1978), where Dean Wade argues the same position:
In the case of products liability, the fault inheres primarily in the nature of the product.
The product is "bad" because it is not duly safe ... [Ilt is not necessary to prove negli-
gence in letting the thing get in the dangerous condition. . . Instead, simply maintaining
the bad condition or placing the bad product on the market is enough for liability...
This is legal fault, and it can be mixed with and compared with, fault of the morally
reprehensible type. One does not have to stigmatize conduct as negligent in order to char-
acterize it as fault (emphasis added).
71. See supra note 70.
72. Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976)
(applying Idaho law).
73. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978).
74. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
75. Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981).
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sota,76 and the Virgin Islands, 77 have also found principles of compara-
tive negligence compatible with strict products liability, but have
adopted a system of "comparative causation. '78 Unlike either negli-
gence per se or comparative fault, comparative causation focuses on
both the plaintiffs and defective product's causal contribution to the
injury, rather than either party's degree of fault or negligence. Specifi-
cally, juries are to apportion damages on the basis of the relative degree
to which "the injury was caused by the defect in the product versus how
much was caused by the plaintiff's own actions. ' 79 In short, these
courts have developed a workable system of comparison based upon
causation which they believe to be capable of a juror's logical and con-
sistent application.
Joint and Several Liability
Historically, a joint tortfeasor was jointly and severally liable for
the plaintiffs entire injury.80 American courts reasoned that each joint
tortfeasor was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs indivisible injury,
and hence, each should be liable for the whole of the consequences. 8'
Consequently, a successful plaintiff could proceed against any one of
the joint tortfeasors and recover the entire judgment. The inequity of
this doctrine was magnified by the common law prohibition against
contribution among joint tortfeasors. 82 For example, a joint tortfeasor
76. Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). In Busch, the court found
comparative principles applicable to strict products liability and relied on Dippel v. Sciano, 37
Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967), since its comparative negligence statute was fashioned after
the Wisconsin statute. The court, however, clearly adopted the comparative causation approach
when it stated:
[Tihe comparative negligence statute becomes more than a comparative negligence or
even a comparativefault statute; it becomes a comparative cause statute under which all
independent and concurrent causes of an accident may be apportioned on a percentage
basis.
262 N.W.2d at 394, (quoting Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Torteasors
in Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723, 725 (1974)).
77. Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin Islands law).
78. Comparative causation as defined by one court requires the trier of fact to "weigh the
plaintiffs misconduct, if any, and reduce the amount of damages by the percentage that the plain-
tiffs misconduct contributed to cause his loss or injury. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
118 N.H. at 813, 395 A.2d at 850.
79. Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 159 (3d Cir. 1979) (emphasis added) (applying
Virgin Islands law).
80. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 47 at 293.
81. Id. at 297-98.
82. The common law doctrine prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors originated
from the English case of Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799), and was pre-
mised on the principle "in pari delicto potior est conditio defendenfis"-no man can make his own
misconduct the ground for an action in his favor. Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly
Chargedfor Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176, 177-78 (1898).
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who was made to bear more than his proportionate share of plaintiffs
injury would have no judicial recourse against the other tortfeasors
whose wrongful acts also proximately caused the plaintiffs injury. 83
Today, however, the majority of jurisdictions including Illinois84 have
abolished this prohibition and allow contribution. 85 Thus, a joint
tortfeasor who is made to bear more than his percentage of the plain-
tiffs injury may bring an action for contribution and recover from each
of the other joint tortfeasors. On the other hand, however, the common
law doctrine of joint and several liability has remained virtually un-
changed in all but a handful of jurisdictions. 86 In those jurisdictions
which have abolished contributory negligence and replaced it with
comparative negligence the question has frequently arisen as to
whether it was appropriate to retain joint and several liability.87 Some
state legislatures have responded by specifically reaffirming the doc-
trine in their comparative negligence statutes.88 Other states have judi-
cially decided to retain the doctrine. 89
The leading case analyzing whether the adoption of comparative
negligence warranted the elimination of joint and several liability was
decided by the California Supreme Court in American Motorcycle Asso-
ciation v. Superior Court.9° There, the defendant argued that the quid
83. Dean Prosser recognized this harsh result when he stated: There is obvious lack of sense
and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were
equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone . . . while the latter goes
scot free. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 50 at 307.
84. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 111. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
85. Only seven jurisdictions retain the common law prohibition against contribution among
joint tortfeasors: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Nebraska, Ohio and South Carolina.
See H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 421 at 227 (1978) and § 193 (Supp. 1983); see also V.
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 16.7 (Supp. 1981); Annot. 60 A.L.R.2d 1366 (1958).
86. The following states have eliminated the common law doctrine ofjoint and several liabil-
ity: Kansas-Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978) (court interpreting KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-258a(d) (1976)); Nevada-NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.141 3 (1979); New Hampshire-N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1975); New Mexico-Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.,
98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (1982); Oklahoma-Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978);
Vermont-Howard v. Spafford, 132 Vt. 434, 321 A.2d 74 (1974) (interpreting VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1036 (1973)).
87. See supra note 86 and infra notes 88-89.
88. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-803(4) (1976).
89. Conkright v. Ballantyne of Omaha, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Maday v.
Yellow Taxi Co., 311 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1981); Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Ford, Bacon &
Davis Constr. Corp., 96 Wis. 2d 314, 291 N.W.2d 825 (1980); Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 100 Idaho
590, 603 P.2d 156 (1979); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d
899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978); Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979);
Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975); Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
193 Neb. 752, 229 N.W.2d 183 (1975); Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286
N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972); Gazaway v. Nicholson, 190 Ga. 345, 9 S.E.2d 154 (1940).
90. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
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pro quo of California's adoption of comparative negligence was its
elimination of joint and several liability. Specifically, the defendant
argued that the doctrine of joint and several liability should be elimi-
nated because with the advent of comparative negligence came a basis
for dividing damages, making a once indivisible injury divisible.9' The
court, however, decided to retain the doctrine, reasoning that "appor-
tioning fault on a comparative negligence basis does not render an in-
divisible injury 'divisible'," since the defendant remains a proximate
cause of plaintiffs injury.92 In addition, the California court feared
that the abolition of joint and several liability would "work a serious
and unwarranted deleterious effect on the practical ability of negli-
gently injured persons to receive adequate compensation for their inju-
ries."'93 In at least nine other jurisdictions, courts have also decided to
retain the joint and several rule and have relied upon similar
rationales. 94
Two states, Texas 95 and Oregon,96 have also elected to retain joint
and several liability, but have statutorily limited its effect. These states
have taken a novel stand by holding a defendant jointly and severally
liable only in those situations where his causal negligence is assessed as
equal to or greater than the plaintiff's. 97 Otherwise, the defendant is
responsible only for his proportionate share of causal negligence. As
an illustration, consider this hypothetical. By means of a special ver-
dict the jury has assessed the causal negligence of plaintiff A, and de-
fendants B, and C as 40%, 50%, and 10%, respectively. As a result of
this "compromise" approach, defendant B will be held responsible for
60% of the plaintiffs damages should defendant C prove to be insol-
vent. On the other hand, defendant C will never be held responsible
for more than 10% of the plaintiffs damages, even if defendant B
proves to be insolvent, since his proportionate share of causal negli-
gence was less than the plaintiff's.
98
A few states, however, have legislatively eliminated the common
law doctrine of joint and several liability and have replaced it with a
system which allocates each defendant's liability in direct proportion to
91. Id. at 588, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
94. See supra note 89.
95. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a § 2(c) (Vernon 1976-77).
96. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.485 (1975).
97. See supra notes 95-96.
98. See also WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE-COMPARATIVE FAULT, § 13:4, at 226 (1978).
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his individual degree of fault or causal contribution to the injury. 99 For
example, a Nevada statute provides:
Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant in such
an action, the defendants are jointly and severally liable to the plain-
tiff, except that a defendant whose negligence is less than that of the
plaintiff or his decedent is jointly liable and is severally liable to the
plaintiff only for that portion of the judgment which represents the
percentage of negligence attributable to him.' °°
Nevertheless, the majority of jurisdictions which have instituted com-
parative negligence by statute, have statutes which leave the common
law doctrine of joint and several liability unaffected, and thus, have left
its future to the judiciary.'0 '
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
Coney v. JL. G. Industries, Inc.
On January 24, 1978, Clifford M. Jasper died as a result of injuries
sustained while operating a hydraulic aerial work platform manufac-
tured by the defendant, J.L.G. Industries. 0 2 Jack A. Coney, adminis-
trator of the decedent's estate, filed a complaint at law consisting of two
counts of strict products liability in the circuit court of Peoria
County 0 3 under the Illinois Wrongful Death and Survival Acts.' °4
The defendant filed two affirmative defenses. The first alleged that
the decedent was comparatively negligent in his operation of the hy-
draulic aerial work platform. The second affirmative defense alleged
that the decedent's employer was comparatively negligent in failing to
provide him with a "groundman."' 05 Thus, defendant requested that
the court recognize comparative negligence as a defense to this strict
products liability action. In addition, defendant requested that the
court compare its fault, if any, with that of the decedent and the dece-
dent's employer, and accordingly hold it liable only for its relative per-
centage of fault.1°6
At trial, both of defendant's affirmative defenses were stricken on
plaintiff's motion, but the court certified three questions for appeal. 0 7
99. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1975); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 41.141 3 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (1976).
100. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 3 (1979).
101. See supra note 89.
102. Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 II1. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983).
103. Id.
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, par. I et seq. and ch. 110 1/2 par. 27-6 (1977).
105. 97 Il1. 2d at 109, 454 N.E.2d at 199.
106. Id.
107. The court certified the following questions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308:
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Third District denied defend-
ant's leave to appeal in an unpublished order, but defendant's leave to
appeal was granted by the Illinois Supreme Court. 0 8
THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT'S REASONING
In Coney, the court was faced with the primary issue of whether to
hold its judicially created doctrine of comparative negligence applica-
ble to an action in strict products liability. The court relied on a brief
filed by amicus curiae t°9and the dissents in Daly v. General Motors
Corp. II0 to furnish the principal arguments against the application.'1 '
Amicus curiae and the dissenters in Daly believed that the application
of comparative negligence would undermine the policy behind strict
products liability; that the imposition of comparative negligence would
lessen the manufacturer's incentive to produce a safe and defect-free
product; and that the "apples" of negligence were incomparable with
the "oranges" of strict liability. 1 2 In reaching its decision to hold prin-
ciples of comparative negligence applicable to strict products liability,
the court systematically negated these arguments.
First, the Coney court stated that in Suvada it had adopted strict
liability in tort to lessen the problems in proof and to abolish the neces-
sity of privity associated with the negligence and warranty theories of
recovery.'13 Neither of these considerations, the court declared, would
Whether the doctrine of comparative negligence or fault is applicable to actions or
claims seeking recovery under products liability or strict liability in tort theories? "
Whether the doctrine of comparative negligence or fault eliminates joint and several
liability?
Whether the retention of joint and several liability in a system of comparative negligence
or fault denies defendants equal protection of the laws in violation of U.S. Const.
Amend. XIV, § I and Ill. Const. 1970, § 2 as to causes of action arising on or after [sic]
March 1, 1978. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, § 301 et. seq.)?
97 Ill. 2d at 110, 454 N.E.2d at 199. In addressing the issue of whether the retention of joint and
several liability coupled with the defendant's inability to gain contribution was violative of the
defendant's right to equal protection, the court said that the question was whether its prospective
application of Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978), was constitutionally allowable. 97 Ill. 2d at 125, 454 N.E.2d at 206.
Defendant argued that since the present cause of action arose prior to the date of Skinner's pro-
spective application, it might be forced to bear more than its proportionate share of plaintiffs
injury. Id. The court, however, found this argument to be "without merit," because the Supreme
Court has itself held in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932),
that the prospective application of a new precedent is not violative of the Federal Constitution.
Id.
108. 97 Ill. 2d at 109-10, 454 N.E.2d at 199.
109. Brief filed by Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.
110. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978), (Jefferson, J., dissenting and
Mosk, J., dissenting).
111. 97 Ill. 2d at 114, 116, 454 N.E.2d at 201-02.
112. See supra notes l10-11.
113. 97 Ill. 2d at 116, 454 N.E.2d at 202.
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be affected by its decision to hold comparative principles applicable to
strict products liability. 1 4 Secondly, the court argued that the imposi-
tion of comparative principles would not lessen a manufacturer's incen-
tive to produce a reasonably safe and defect-free product, since it
would still remain strictly liable. Rather, it is only the manufacturer's
responsibility for damages that would be lessened, and only in those
circumstances where the plaintiffs misconduct is found by the trier of
fact to have contributed to the injury."15 In addition, the court indi-
cated that one of the underlying goals of strict liability in tort was to
spread the risk of product defects among all consumers. The court,
however, could see no reason to make all consumers bear the full cost
of an injury resulting partially from plaintiffs own careless conduct. 11
6
Similarly, the court rejected the Dal, dissenters' third argument
that strict liability and negligence were "noncomparables" and adopted
a method of comparison which would allow the trier of fact to compare
the plaintiffs and the defective product's causal contribution to the in-
jury; damages would be apportioned accordingly.'1 7 The court labeled
this method of comparison "comparative fault."" 8 The court stated
that the implementation of comparative fault will mean that the de-
fenses of misuse" 9 and assumption of the risk 120 will no longer bar
plaintiff's recovery, but instead will now be compared with the defec-
tive product's causal contribution to the injury.' 2' By the same token,
the court reaffirmed the generally recognized rule that "[tihe consumer
or user is entitled to believe that the product will do the job for which it




117. Id. at 118, 454 N.E.2d at 203. The Coney court recognized the theoretical difficulty in-
volved in such a comparison, but nevertheless was persuaded by the fact that jurors in other
jurisdictions have been able to do so. The court quoted Professor Schwartz who said:
It is true that the jury might have some difficulty in making the calculation required
under comparative negligence when defendant's responsibility is based on strict liability.
Nevertheless, this obstacle is more conceptual than practical. The jury should always be
capable, when the plaintiff has been objectively at fault, of taking into account how
much bearing that fault had on the amount of damage suffered and of adjusting and
reducing the award accordingly. Triers of fact are apparently able to do this, and the
benefits from the approach suggest that it be applied in all comparative negligence
jurisdictions.
Id. at 117, 454 N.E.2d at 202-03 (quoting V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 12.7, at
208-09 (1974)).
118. Id. at 119, 454 N.E.2d at 204.
119. Id. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
120. Id. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla. 1976)).
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failing to inspect and discover a defect which would have been discov-
ered upon a reasonable inspection, will not be subject to comparison as
a damage-reducing factor.'
23
The second issue addressed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Co-
ney was whether the adoption of comparative negligence or fault re-
quired the elimination of joint and several liability. The defendant in
Coney argued that joint and several liability was the "corollary" of
contributory negligence, 24 and that it therefore should be eliminated
as the quidpro quo of comparative negligence. The court, however,
disagreed and justified its retention of the doctrine by first stating that
the vast majority of jurisdictions which have adopted comparative neg-
ligence have retained joint and several liability.' 25
Having determined that the retention of the doctrine of joint and
several liability was the majority rule, the court proceeded to justify its
decision to retain the doctrine by stating four reasons previously articu-
lated by the Supreme Court of California inAmerican Motorcycle Asso-
ciation v. Superior Court. 126 In American Motorcycle Association the
court believed that the elimination of joint and several liability would
seriously affect the injured plaintiffs ability to obtain adequate com-
pensation for his injuries; that even the plaintiff with "clean hands"
would, in certain circumstances, be made to bear a portion of his own
injury; that the court's ability to apportion fault on a comparative basis
does not change the fact that the defendant remains a proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injury. The court noted that even when the plaintiff
himself is negligent, his misconduct represents only a lack of due care
for himself, whereas a defendant's lack of due care for others is tor-
tious. 27 In sum, the California court believed that it was in the best
interests of society to place the burden of the insolvent or immune de-
fendant on the defendants, rather than on the aggrieved plaintiff. The
Coney court similarly believed that it was in society's best interests to
leave this burden on the solvent defendant and thus leave it to the
wrongdoers to work out between themselves any apportionment. 28
Additionally, the Coney court explained that the concept of "fairness"
as advocated by the court inAlvis v. Ribar, 29 did not require it to elim-
inate joint and several liability as the quidpro quo of comparative neg-
123. Id.
124. 1d. at 120, 454 N.E.2d at 204.
125. Id.
126. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
127. Id. at 588-89, 578 P.2d at 905-06, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
128. 97 I. 2d at 123, 454 N.E.2d at 205.
129. 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
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ligence, since an elimination of this doctrine would, in certain
circumstances, act to reduce a plaintiff's recovery "beyond the percent-
age of fault attributable to him," and, thus, deprive the plaintiff of an
adequate right to redress.
130
The court found further support for the retention of joint and sev-
eral liability in "An Act in relation to contribution among joint
tortfeasors," passed by the Illinois General Assembly in 1979.131 Ac-
cording to the court, this Act which specifically provides the plaintiff
the "right to recover the full amount of his judgment from any one or
more defendants subject to liability,"' 32 expresses the legislature's in-
tent to retain joint and several liability, and to place the burden of an
immune or insolvent defendant on the solvent defendants. 133
ANALYSIS
As a matter of fairness, a manufacturer should not be made to
bear the burden of the user's entire injury when the user's own miscon-
duct has contributed to the injury. Similarly, a user should not be ab-
solutely barred from recovery solely because he has misused or
voluntarily assumed the risk of being injured by a defective product.
Instead, a plaintiff seeking recovery in strict products liability should be
awarded damages on a comparative basis taking into account both the
plaintiff's and the defective product's contribution to the injury. In Co-
ney v. JL.G. Industries, Inc. ,34 the Illinois Supreme Court correctly
recognized that these equitable considerations are much the same as
those which prompted its own judicial development of comparative
negligence and thus should be incorporated into Illinois' products lia-
bility law.
In order to evaluate the court's decision in Coney, it is essential
that it be measured in light of the strong public policy considerations
underlying the Alvis v. Ribar135 and Suvada v. White Motor Co. 136 deci-
sions. In Suvada, the court adopted strict liability in tort to lessen the
problems of proof, abolish the necessity of privity and spread the risk
of product defects among all consumers, rather than placing the risk on
only a few who would be unable to protect themselves. 137 The Coney
130. 97 111. at 123, 454 N.E.2d at 205.
131. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, par. 301 et seq. (1979)).
132. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, par. 304, § 4 (1979). See infra note 165.
133. 97 Ill. 2d at 123, 454 N.E.2d at 205.
134. 97 I11. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197.
135. 85 IUI. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
136. 32 111. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
137. In Suvada, the court expressly adopted strict liability in tort to lessen proof requirements
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court correctly recognized that these fundamental considerations would
not be frustrated by the court's decision to apply principles of compara-
tive fault to strict products liability. 38 After Coney, a user or consumer
who is injured by a defective product still need not prove that the de-
fect was a result of the manufacturer's negligent conduct, nor does he
need to be in privity to recover. Rather, a user or consumer need only
continue to prove that the injury "resulted from a condition of the
product, that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one, and
that the condition existed at the time it left the manufacturer's
control." 39
Moreover, the loss-spreading rationale underlying the landmark
Suvada decision is equally preserved after Coney. The "justice of im-
posing the loss on the one creating the risk and reaping the profit"'
' 40
has not been diminished as a result of the court's application of com-
parative principles to strict products liability, because all injuries
caused by unreasonably dangerous and defective products will con-
tinue to be borne by the manufacturer.' 4' It is only that portion of the
plaintiff's injury that he himself has caused for which the manufacturer
will no longer be responsible. Hence, the manufacturer remains strictly
liable for the "risk" that it has created, but not for that part of plaintiff's
injury that the plaintiff has created and from which he had the power to
protect himself. To state it differently, the manufacturer will continue
to be responsible for compensating consumers for injuries suffered due
to defective products, but such responsibility will stop short of treating
the manufacturer as an absolute insurer of the safety of its product.
An additional rationale often stated as underlying the strict liabil-
ity in tort theory of recovery is that it provides an incentive for manu-
facturers to produce a safe and defect-free product. 142 This incentive is
also unaffected by the court's decision in Coney. As a result of the
and abolish the necessity of privity. In addition, the court recognized the "loss-spreading" ration-
ale, at least impliedly, when it stated:
[Plublic interest in human life and health, the invitations and solicitations to purchase
the product and the justice of imposing the loss on the one creating the risk and reaping the
profit are present and as compelling in cases involving motor vehicles and other prod-
ucts, where the defective condition makes them unreasonably dangerous to the user, as
they are in food cases (emphasis added).
Id. at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186.
138. "We believe that application of comparative fault principles in strict products liability
actions would not frustrate this court's fundamental reasons for adopting strict products liability
as set out in Suvada." 97 I11. 2d at 116, 454 N.E.2d at 202.
139. See supra note 32.
140. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 I11. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965).
141. 97 111. 2d at 116, 454 N.E.2d at 202.
142. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978).
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court's careful reaffirmance of the user's or consumer's right to assume
that a product will do the job for which it is built, a plaintiff will con-
tinue to be protected from having his recovery reduced as a result of a
careless but accidental injury caused by his "unobservant, inattentive,
ignorant, or awkward failure to discover or guard against a defect."'
143
Also, a plaintiff who prior to Coney would have been absolutely barred
from recovery for misusing or assuming the risk of a defective product,
will as a result of Coney be allowed a reduced recovery. Consequently,
a manufacturer's overall liability for defective products, and hence, in-
centive to produce a reasonably safe and defect-free product, will re-
main approximately the same.
In Alvis, the court adopted comparative negligence because "a
more just and socially desirable distribution of loss is demanded by
today's society." 1  Moreover, the court selected the pure form of com-
parative negligence because the court found it to be "the only system
which truly apportions damages according to the relative fault of the
parties and, thus, achieves total justice." 145 However, as the defendant
in Coney pointed out to the court, there was no "total justice" in the
fact that under present Illinois law, a plaintiff who brought an action
against a manufacturer under alternate theories of strict liability and
negligence would be barred from recovery in the strict liability count
when his misconduct constituted assumption of the risk, but identical
conduct in the negligence count merely would act to reduce his recov-
ery.' 46 Although the court in Coney did not specifically point to this
anomaly in the law as a principal reason for its decision, the court's
decision to apply comparative principles to strict products liability has
corrected this problem and as a consequence has brought additional
consistency and fairness to Illinois' products liability law. Moreover,
the court's decision has further advanced the "fairness" and "total jus-
tice" concepts of Alvis through its elimination of the absolute bar to
recovery previously associated with the affirmative defenses of misuse
and assumption of the risk. No longer will these two harsh and inflexi-
ble defenses intervene to preclude plaintiffs recovery. Instead, the
court will instruct the jury to compare both the plaintiffs and the defec-
tive product's causal contribution to the injury, and apportion damages
equitably. 47
143. 97 IU. 2d at 119, 454 N.E.2d at 204.
144. 85 IlI. 2d I, 17, 421 N.E.2d 886, 893 (1981).
145. Id. at 27, 421 N.E.2d at 898.
146. 97 III. 2d at 112, 454 N.E.2d at 200.
147. See infra note 148.
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Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Coney decision was the
court's selection of a method of comparison based on causation.'
48
Rather than selecting a method of comparison which would instruct the
trier of fact to compare the user's fault with the manufacturer's "legal"
fault, as the California court in Daly advocated, 49 the Coney court
adopted a method of comparison which compares the defective prod-
uct's causal contribution to the injury with the plaintiffs causal contri-
bution to the injury, and apportions damages accordingly. 50 Although
the court labeled this method of comparison one of "comparative
fault," it is essentially one of "comparative causation."' 5' It is interest-
ing to note that only a minority of jurisdictions which have found both
comparative principles and strict products liability compatible have se-
lected this method of comparison.' 52 However, this method of compar-
ison is far superior to the true system of comparative fault as advocated
in Daly. Comparative causation has the advantage of avoiding the an-
alytical difficulties which are bound to confuse jurors having to make
comparisons of such dissimilar types of fault as strict liability and neg-
ligence.' 53 Although strict products liability is not liability without
fault, it is a radically different type of fault than that which laypersons
commonly associate with negligence, and a juror's comparison of the
two would prove difficult at best. Comparative causation, on the other
hand, compares the plaintiff's and the defective product's causal contri-
bution to the injury, and thus, rests on simpler and more conceptually
comparable grounds.
Moreover, comparative causation has the additional advantage of
keeping the juror's focus on the condition of the product, rather than
148. 97 111. 2d at 118, 454 N.E.2d at 203. The Coney court specifically stated, "We believe that
equitable principles require that the total damages for plaintiffs injuries be apportioned on the
basis of the relative degree to which the defective product and plaintiffs conduct proximately
caused them." (emphasis added).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
150. 97 I11. 2d at 118, 454 N.E.2d at 203.
151. Note that in Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin
Islands law), relied upon by the Coney court, the court recognized that what they were applying
was really comparative causation, but because the term "comparative fault" was more readily
used by the courts they chose to label their method of comparison comparative fault.
152. See supra notes 72-77.
153. The court in Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978),
adopted comparative causation and similarly argued:
Semantic and conceptual clarity is essential if the jury is to understand a defective design
case ...we do not recommend to plaintiffs that counts in both negligence and strict
liability against the same defendant be submitted to the jury because of the confusion
which is created . . .The jury should not be expected to grasp the extremely fine distinc-
tions the trial court attempts to provide in its explanation that "comparative negligence"
in a strict liability case does not really require a comparison of the parties' "negligence."
Id. at 811-12, 395 A.2d at 849.
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on the manufacturer's legal fault in marketing a defective product.
This is advantageous because the condition of the product is precisely
what makes the manufacturer liable in the first place. 54 In contrast,
the method of comparison embraced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in Dippel v. Sciano '5- which analogizes strict products liability to negli-
gence per se requires the jurors to focus on the manufacturer's negli-
gence in their apportionment of damages. 56  This method of
comparison, conceded by the court to be a legal fiction, 5 7 is totally
erroneous as it sacrifices logic and common sense in exchange for se-
mantic clarity. The traditional doctrine of negligence per se is based on
negligence and not strict liability, and more importantly allows numer-
ous excuses through which the defendant can avoid liability, 158 whereas
strict products liability does not. Although it is true that in both negli-
gence per se and strict products liability the plaintiff is relieved of the
burden of proving the defendant's negligence, 159 such a similarity alone
does not make the two doctrines equivalent.
An important consideration to the court in its decision to retain the
long-standing doctrine of joint and several liability was the fact that the
majority of courts which had adopted comparative negligence had re-
tained joint and several liability. As the Coney court correctly pointed
out, the defendant's reliance on several courts which had adopted com-
parative negligence and eliminated joint and several liability was un-
persuasive. 160 Each of these courts was interpreting the unique
language of its comparative negligence statute, rather than making its
own public policy determination as to the necessity of retaining or
eliminating joint and several liability. For example, in Brown v.
154. See supra note 32.
155. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). See supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
156. Id. at 450, 155 N.W.2d at 60.
157. See Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 600, 235 N.W.2d 677, 684 (1975). See also Howes
v. John Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976); Twerski, supra note 13 at 322.
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965). Excused Violations:
(1) An excused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation is
not negligence.
(2) Unless the enactment or regulation is construed not to permit such excuse, its viola-
tion is excused when
(a) the violation is reasonable because of the actor's incapacity;
(b) he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for compliance;
(c) he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to comply;
(d) he is confronted by an emergency not due to his own misconduct;
(e) compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the actor or to others.
Moreover, comment a, provides: "The list of situations in which a violation may be excused is not
intended to be exclusive. There may be other excuses." (emphasis added).
159. See PROSSER, supra note 13, at 200, 672.
160. 97 Ill. 2d at 120, 124, 454 N.E.2d at 204, 206.
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Kell,'6' one of the cases relied upon by the defendant, the court was
faced with the question of whether its legislature had intended to elimi-
nate joint and several liability when it had passed a comparative negli-
gence statute. 162 In Brown, the court confronted the question by noting
that "[t]he interpretive problem facing this court is not one of determin-
ing sound public policy as suggested by appellant. The problem is
rather the construction of the statute to carry into effect the legislative
intention, whatever that might be."'1 63 The court in Brown concluded its
analysis of the legislature's intent when it said that "[tihe legislature
intended to equate recovery and duty to pay to degree of fault."' 164 In
Illinois, however, such an interpretation of the legislature's desire
would be inappropriate. In 1979, the Illinois General Assembly specifi-
cally reaffirmed a plaintiffs common law right to collect his entire
judgment from any one of several defendants jointly liable. 65 Al-
though this Act was passed prior to the court's adoption of comparative
negligence, if the legislature had desired to abolish or even limit the
doctrine of joint and several liability it could have done so in a subse-
quent session.
The Coney court's decision to retain joint and several liability was
clearly in the best interests of society. An injured plaintiff should con-
tinue to be allowed to recover from any and all defendants adjudged a
proximate cause of his injury. Although comparative negligence pro-
vides a workable basis for apportioning losses, its adoption by the court
in Alvis was not meant to diminish or destroy a plaintiff's right to re-
161. 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978).
162. Id. The pertinent part of the Kansas statute provides:
Where the comparative negligence of the parties in any action is an issue and recovery is
allowed against more than one party, each such party shall be liable for that portion of
the total dollar amount awarded as damages to any claimant in the proportion that the
amount of his or her causal negligence bears to the amount of the causal negligence
attributed to all parties against whom such recovery is allowed.
KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-258A (6) (1978).
163. Id. at 201, 580 P.2d at 873 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 203, 580 P.2d at 873-74.
165. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70 (1979), provides in part:
Sec. 3. Amount of Contribution. The pro rata share of each tortfeasor shall be deter-
mined in accordance with his relative culpability. However, no person shall be required
to contribute to one seeking contribution an amount greater than his pro rata share un-
less the obligation of one or more of the joint tortfeasors is uncollectable. In that event,
the remaining tortfeasors shall share the unpaid portions of the uncollectable obligation
in accordance with their pro rata liability.
If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single
share. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, par. 303 (1979).
Sec. 4. Rights of Plaintiff Unaffected. A plaintiffs right to recover the full amount of
his judgment from any one or more defendants subject to liability in tort for the same
injury to person or property, or for wrongful death, is not affected by the provisions of
this Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70 par. 304 (1979).
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cover that portion of his injury for which he was not responsible. It is
plain that there is nothing fair in requiring a solvent tortfeasor who is
responsible for only 10% of the plaintiff's injury to also bear the burden
of the remaining 90% when his fellow tortfeasors prove insolvent.
However, it is equally unfair to allow a plaintiff to recover only 10% of
his injury when the same defendants prove to be unable to pay. Of the
two alternatives, the former is the more equitable, since it is the injured
plaintiff who is presumably the least able to bear the loss.
CONCLUSION
Two years have passed since the Illinois Supreme Court in Alvis
adopted comparative negligence, yet it was not until Coney that two of
the issues left undecided were finally resolved. Although the court has
been slow in resolving these issues, it has taken a well-founded stand
emphasizing the importance of preserving the plaintiff's right to receive
adequate compensation for his injuries. None of the fundamental rea-
sons for adopting strict liability in tort have been adversely affected by
the court's decision in Coney. In fact, the injured plaintiff will continue
to be free from proving the manufacturer's negligence and privity re-
mains irrelevant to recovery. In addition, the loss-spreading rationale
of Suvada and the manufacturer's incentive to produce a safe and de-
fect-free product have both been preserved. More importantly, how-
ever, the application of comparative negligence to strict products
liability will result in a much fairer allocation of damages than had
existed previously. No longer will the harsh and inflexible defenses of
assumption of the risk and misuse act as an absolute bar to the plain-
tiff's recovery. Nor will a plaintiffs misconduct go totally unnoticed by
the court. Rather, the court will instruct the jury to apportion damages
on a comparative basis taking into account both the plaintiffs and the
defective product's causal contribution to the injury.
The court's retention of joint and several liability in an environ-
ment that utilizes comparative principles to apportion damages was the
correct decision. Although the court has developed a logical system of
apportioning damages between parties, each joint tortfeasor remains a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. Moreover, the elimination of
joint and several liability would in some situations act to reduce a
plaintiff's recovery beyond that part of his injury for which he was re-
sponsible, and thus, deprive him of a fair and adequate compensation
for his injuries.
